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ERICH ROSS DIENER, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
AN APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER (3/25/2003), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
The Hon. Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 98-490-1948 DA) 
Respondent/Appellant, Erich Diener, by and through counsel, 
submits the following reply brief: 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellee Tiffany Jacobs Diener did not file an appeal. Her 
gratuitous recitation of "issues presented for review" in Mr. 
Diener's appeal is not helpful. The opening brief filed by 
appellant, Erich Ross Diener, sets forth the issues presented for 
review and now before this Court. No other issues are before the 
court. 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The record does not support Tiffany Diener's statement of 
certain facts: 
1. Tiffany states "Mr. Diener told Tiffany that he 
considered [$5000.00 paid toward his] tuition a loan . . . ." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 4 (citing Transcript, p. 56). Nowhere does 
the record contain such a statement. Rather, the money Tiffany 
paid to help Erich attend Harvard for a semester was identified 
as an "investment in [the parties'] future." Transcript, p. 61. 
Regardless, there is no mention of the "Harvard" money in the 
original decree. Transcript, p. 62. 
2. Tiffany indicates that she "purchased a number of 
things for Erich's benefit prior to the marriage because Mr. 
Diener often talked her into buying such things, saying that he 
would pay Tiffany back later." Brief of Appellee, p. 4. There 
is no mention of these items nor any indication of pre-marital 
debts (if indeed such existed) in the original decree. See 
Decree (R. 36); Transcript, p. 9. Furthermore, there is no 
mention of any debts (if indeed such existed), that Erich owed to 
Tiffany in the decree. Transcript, p. 9. 
3. Tiffany makes much of a whole life insurance policy that 
was purchased. Brief of Appellee, p. 3 & 4. The sole reference 
in the record to that policy is vague: 
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Q. [By John Call] She also had a life insurance 
policy, a whole life policy that was purchased for her 
after her parents died? 
A. [By Erich Diener] Okay. 
Q. Do you recall that? 
A. I think so, yes sir? 
Q. During the marriage was that ever cashed out? 
A. It may have been. 
Transcript, p. 36. There is no evidence or indication in the 
record as to the cash value. Thus, Ms. Diener's reference is not 
helpful. 
4. Tiffany indicates, "Mr. Diener reviewed the matter 
[divorce] at least once with a Judge Advocate General attorney 
. . ." Brief of Appellee, p. 4. That is not accurate. Erich 
generally consulted with a JAG attorney while stationed at Fort 
Meade, Maryland in 1997 several months prior to the instigation 
of the divorce action. Transcript, p. 4 & 7. The divorce action 
was not filed until March 13, 1998. Thus, Mr. Diener did not 
have the matter "reviewed" by a JAG attorney. Furthermore, he 
was not represented by counsel at the time of the divorce decree 
or in the original proceeding. Transcript, p. 4 & 16. 
5. Tiffany asserts that "Mr. Diener admitted that he 
discussed with Tiffany the higher child support and his desire 
that Tiffany not pursue an alimony claim . . . ." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 5. Again, that is not entirely accurate. Erich 
testified that had no discussions with Tiffany in negotiations 
3 
for settlement of the divorce regarding increased child support 
in exchange for waiver of alimony. Transcript, p. 42-43. 
6. Tiffany asserts "After the parties agreed to the terms, 
Tiffany moved back to Salt Lake City and pursued the divorce 
action." Brief of Appellee, p. 5. If this assertion were 
accurate, then she entirely failed to put the "agreed upon terms" 
in the divorce papers. Neither the parties' original settlement 
stipulation nor the original decree recite the terms of this 
alleged increased child support agreement. The parties7 
unwritten "agreement" is so indefinite and amorphous and so 
lacking in terms to be unenforceable.1 
7. Ms. Diener states, "Pursuant to their agreement, the 
parties entered into a stipulation whereby Mr. Diener agreed to 
pay $400 a month in child support." Brief of Appellee, p. 5. 
However, no finding in the original Findings of Fact in 1998 
support any such bargain or agreement, or support child support 
in excess of the guidelines (see R. 26). No indication of any 
such bargain or agreement is found in the parties' Stipulation 
1
 The terms in the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 
10) specifically decline alimony: "This is a brief marriage of 
3-1/2 years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able to 
provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to 
the other." Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The original Findings of 
Fact reads identical (R. 29). Finally, the Decree of Divorce 
declines alimony. Decree, p. 3 (R. 35). 
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and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there is no 
indication of any such bargain or agreement in the parties' 
Decree of Divorce (see R. 33). 
8. Ms. Diener recites a litany of figures related to Mr. 
Diener's alleged income. Brief of Appellee, p. 6-7. She 
concludes that "Mr. Diener received income between $1,751 and 
$2,281 per month." Brief of Appellee, p. 7. Those figures were 
not findings made by the lower court. See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 203-205). 
9. Ms. Diener states "Mr. Diener . . . terminated his 
employment with Tucci's . . . " and "he terminated his employment 
with TEKsystems . . . ." Brief of Appellee, p. 7. These 
statements are distortions. Tiffany appears to suggest that Mr. 
Diener voluntarily ended employment with these employers. There 
is no such evidence to support such a suggestion. Rather, Mr. 
Diener testified that no further work was available to him 
through TEKsystems. Transcript, p. 24. No evidence was offered 
as to Mr. Diener's termination of employment from Tucci's. See 
Transcript, p. 22. 
10. Appellee states that "Mr. Diener was earning about 
$1,450 a month at the time of trial." Brief of Appellee, p. 7. 
The lower court, however, found that Mr. Diener's "gross income 
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is approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . ." 3/25/2003 Order, 
p. 3 (R. 205). 
11. Appellee suggests that "Mr. Diener occasionally 
attempts to qualify [his stipulation that $1,750.00 be imputed to 
him] by saying it was offered only if the trial court found that 
there was a substantial change of circumstances and only if the 
trial court would indeed modify the child support provisions . . 
. ." Brief of Appellee, p. 9. Appellee suggests that Mr. Diener 
was trying to be "clever" by the stipulation. Id. Appellee's 
accusation is baseless and inaccurate. Mr. Diener's stipulation 
was acknowledged by the court as follows: 
Although his most recent financial declaration 
shows his actual income at -$245.00 per month, for the 
sole purpose of calculating child support provided a 
modification is granted in the current proceeding, 
defendant stipulated that income may be imputed to him 
at a total of $1,750.00 per month which approximates 
what would have been his income had [he] been working 
full time . . . ." 
Order Re: Trial Date, p. 2 (R. 144)(emphasis added)(copy attached 
hereto). Mr. Diener stipulated that the amount of $1,750.00 
could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, jLf 
the court found basis for modification. Transcript, p. 29. The 
purpose behind Mr. Diener's stipulation was to facilitate 
settlement/resolution of this matter, and to benefit his child. 
Erich Diener testified that he did not actually earn that amount. 
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Transcript, p. 29. That amount represented what he would earn ij. 
he were able to work full-time at his current rate. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY § 78-45-7.2 
(6) . 
Tiffany Diener's position stems from an alleged agreement 
between the parties that Mr. Diener would pay increased child 
support as "a bargained-for consideration where each of the 
parties made significant concessions in reaching that agreement." 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203). As set forth more fully in Mr. 
Diener's principle brief, there was no finding in the original 
Findings of Fact in 1998 with regard to any such bargain (see R. 
26). There is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there 
is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' Decree of 
Divorce (see R. 33). 
Appellee incorrectly states Mr. Diener's "position . . . 
changed when it became obvious that his income had not changed 
enough to prove a substantial change in circumstances." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 10. That is incorrect. Mr. Diener argued, "The 
decree of divorce should be modified and amended to recalculate 
defendant's child support obligations, etc. in light of the 
7 
substantial change of circumstances of both parties." Petition 
for Modification, \ 8 (R. 45-46)(underlined emphasis added). 
In addition, Mr. Diener argued early in this matter that he 
is entitled to a modification based upon both a substantial 
change to the parties' circumstances and pursuant to the passage 
of three (3) years "since the divorce decree was entered." 
Defendant's Response to Motion to Dismiss Petitioner for 
Modification, p. 1-2 (R. 58-59) . The lower court allowed Mr. 
Diener to argue for a modification on both grounds. Both were 
preserved below and are ripe for review on appeal. 
The cases cited by Tiffany Diener in support of her brief, 
are inapposite. The cases cited involve specific written 
agreements, with specified terms incorporated into the parties' 
decree. Those cases instruct that parties are bound by a written 
property settlement; those cases do not support the same for an 
unwritten "agreement." 
In Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the appellate 
court was called upon to interpret uthe term 'equity' as it 
appeals in the stipulation and property settlement agreement." 
Id. at 1249. Thus, there was a clear, written agreement for the 
court to review. Indeed, the "decree specifically adopted the 
provisions of the written stipulation . . . ." Id. Thus, "the 
law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a 
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property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the 
decree . . . ." Id. at 1251. 
In Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 723 (Utah 1990), again, the 
appellate court was called upon to review written terms of a 
divorce decree, that varied from statutory rights ("The agreed 
decree provided for termination of support upon the death or 
emancipation of a child. The decree stated four events that 
would constitute emancipation but stated that emancipation would 
be postponed if [a child was enrolled in higher education]." Id. 
(underlined emphasis added)). Herein, neither the original 
stipulation nor the original decree contain the terms that 
Tiffany now seeks to enforce. There is no mention whatsoever of 
any bargained-for-exchange agreement asserted by Tiffany. 
In Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981), the obligor 
spouse "entered into a stipulation and property settlement 
agreement with the plaintiff, which was approved and incorporated 
in the decree by the trial court." Id. at 526 (underlined 
emphasis added). The defendant in Despain 
failed to observe the distinction between those cases 
involving the statutory power of the court in a divorce 
proceeding to enter orders concerning support that thsoe 
cases in which the parties in a divorce action has 
settled their property rights by agreement# the terms of 
which are incorporated in a decree. 
9 
Id. at 527 (underlined emphasis added). The appellate court 
continued, "The limitations on the power of the court to order 
support do not limit the rights of the husband and wife to 
contract with respect to the education of their children as a 
part of an agreement settling their property rights." Id. 
From Land and Despain, it is clear that lower courts retain 
jurisdiction to enforce the written terms of parties' agreements 
that are incorporated in a decree.2 The court herein, however, 
lacks jurisdiction to enforce an unwritten, oral agreement some 
five (5) years after it was allegedly made. If the bargained-
for-exchange that Tiffany Diener alleges was incorporated in the 
parties' decree, Erich Diener would have no claim. However, 
Tiffany Diener seeks to enforce an agreement that was neither 
written at the time it was allegedly made, nor incorporated into 
the parties' settlement stipulation and decree. 
Finally, appellee argues that Mr. Diener attempts "to rely 
. . . on a new statute to retain the benefit of his bargain i.e., 
not having to defend claims [by Tiffany] . . . ." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 13. The statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.2 (1953 as amended), is not a "new statute." It was enacted 
in 1989, when the child support guidelines were first 
2
 In addition, the court would have jurisdiction to modify 
based upon statutory grounds set forth by the legislature. 
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established. The statute indicates "The guidelines apply to any 
judicial or administrative order establishing an award of child 
support entered on or after July 1, 1989." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.2 (1) (1953 as amended).3 The statute was in effect when 
the parties' decree was entered. Thus, Ms. Diener is less than 
accurate in describing the pertinent statute as "new." 
Erich Diener is entitled to an adjustment of child support 
based upon the passage of three (3) years and the non-temporary 
difference of 10% pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 
as amended)(subsequently renumbered to subsection (8)). In light 
of the passage of three (3) years from the date the decree was 
entered herein, the court below erred by refusing to recalculate 
child support pursuant to the guidelines and order Erich Diener 
to pay the resulting amount. 
3
 Furthermore, the statute mandates "Notice of the 
opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6) and 
(7) shall be included in each child support order issued or 
modified after July 1, 1997." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 
(8) (subsequently renumbered to subsection (10)) . This provision 
was enacted nearly one (1) year prior to entry of the parties' 
decree herein, prepared by Tiffany Diener's counsel. The decree 
failed to contain such a notice. 
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II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES: 
Ms. Diener now acknowledges that "a showing of a 
substantial, or material change in the circumstances [can] modify 
. . . bargained-for terms in a decree." Brief of Appellee, p. 
11; see also Brief of Appellee, 18.4 The lower court, found 
Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have 
not changed substantially, the Court finds that there is 
no substantial change in circumstances upon which to 
justify modification of the child support Order under § 
78-45-7.2 (7), Utah Code. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207). As set forth in Mr. Diener's 
principle brief, such a conclusion does not flow from the 
testimony presented at trial, nor does it flow from the 
subsidiary findings made by the court. 
Ms. Diener asserts that "the trial court had ample evidence 
to impute income to Mr. Diener in excess of his income at the 
time of the divorce . . . ." Brief of Appellee, p. 15.5 The 
lower court, however, made findings that clearly establish a 
4
 Appellee admits that Mr. Diener can adjust child support 
pursuant to a substantial change in circumstances. However, 
appellee argues that the "three (3) year rule" does not apply. 
The distinction is illogical. Both are statutory rights. Both 
rights must be included in all decrees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.2 (1953 as amended). Appellee's concession defeats the 
claim that there is an enforceable agreement. 
5
 The lower court did not impute income to Mr. Diener. To 
do so, the court must make specific findings. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7.5 (1953 as amended). 
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substantial change in the parties' circumstances. The lower 
found: 
[Mr. Diener] was temporarily employed by Circuit 
City, . . . making about $1,2 00.00. 
[Mr. Diener] was employed by TEKsystems . . ., from 
July 1998 through September 2001 . . . . [He lost said] 
job because of the down-turn of the economy and the 
computer technology industry. 
[Mr. Diener] was unemployed from September 2 001 
through November 2 0 01. 
[Mr. Diener] was employed at Tucci's restaurant from 
November 2 0 01 through October 2 0 02, earning approximately 
$1,560.00 per month, including tips. 
* * * 
[Mr. Diener] worked on contract for TEKsystems . . 
. in 2002. He earned a total of $3,655.00 . . . . 
* * * 
[Mr. Diener] has provided technical computer 
assistance and consulting to the Utah Legal Clinic in 
trade for legal services . . . [totaling $1,200.00 in 
2001 and $1,912.50 in 2002]. 
• * * 
[Mr. Diener] enlisted in the Utah National Guard in 
2002. [He] earns approximately $245.00 per month. 
[Mr. Diener] began working part-time for Gateway 
Academy . . . . * * * [His] gross income is 
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . . 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 3-4 (R. 204-205)(numbering omitted). 
Finally, the court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires a 
college degree uto again obtain gainful employment at a 
reasonable rate of pay." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205). 
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In spite of these specific findings, the court concluded 
that Erich Diener's "financial circumstances have not changed 
substantially .. . ." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207). Such a 
conclusion is erroneous. Erich Diener's financial circumstances 
have changed substantially. His ability to earn has been 
substantially altered, and his earnings have significantly 
decreased. 
Tiffany Diener argues that "the trial court would have 
imputed at least $1,750 monthly income to Mr. Diener . . . and 
$1,192 to Tiffany . . . ." The lower court did not do so. 
Rather, the lower court found that Mr. Diener's "gross income is 
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . ." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 3 
(R. 205). Mr. Diener stipulated that an amount of $1,750.00 
could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, only 
if the court found basis for modification.6 Transcript, p. 28; 
Order Re: Trial Date (R. 144). Mr. Diener did not waive his 
right to claim a substantial change in circumstances. He should 
be permitted to request modifications pursuant to § 78-45-7.2 
(6)&(7)(1953 as amended). Mr. Diener did not stipulate that 
6
 Mr. Diener argued that minimum wage ($886.00) be imputed 
to Tiffany Diener. Mr. Diener did not argue that an income of 
$1,192.00 be imputed to Tiffany Diener. Memorandum of Law/Trial 
Memorandum Re: Child Support, p. 4-5 (R. 156-157). 
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amount be used to determine whether there was a change in his 
earnings, as asserted by Tiffany. 
Tiffany Diener misstates Erich's argument regarding the 
change in Tiffany Diener's circumstances. See Brief of Appellee, 
p. 15. Erich Diener has never suggested that the court solely 
focus on Tiffany Diener's new circumstances. Rather, the court 
must view the overall change in both parties' circumstances. 
The language of the statute reads: 
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may 
at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a 
child support order if there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7) (a) , a substantial 
change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or 
assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income 
of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to 
earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the 
child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities 
of either parent for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (7)(a)&(b) (1953 as amended). The 
language in the statute references both parties. Herein, there 
have been substantial changes in both parties' lives. Indeed, 
the lower court made specific findings that should have resulted 
in a legal conclusion that there are substantial changes to both 
parties' circumstances. 
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In light of the overall, substantial change in the parties' 
circumstances, the lower court erred in failing to recalculate 
child support pursuant to the guidelines. 
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD CAN BE MET BY A 
REDUCTION OF CHILD SUPPORT. 
Appellee misstates Mr. Diener's argument regarding the 
whether a reduction could ever be in the best interests of child. 
Appellee states, "Mr. Diener will be hard-pressed to establish . 
. . that it would be in 'the best interests' of his minor 
daughter for her father to pay a significantly reduced child 
support payments because the custodial parent is not earning any 
income." Brief of Appellee, p. 16 (underlined emphasis added). 
Such was never Mr. Diener's argument. Rather, Mr. Diener 
asks this Court to consider whether it would ever be in the best 
interests of the child to decrease child support. See generally 
Transcript, p. 80-81 ("[C]an you conceive of a situation where 
reducing someone's child support would be in the best interest of 
the child?"). The issue presented for review is set forth in Mr. 
Diener's principle brief: uIs it ever in the child's best 
interest to reduce support?" Brief of Appellant, p. 3. 
Appellee largely ignores the analysis in Overby v. Overby, 
698 So.2d 811 (Fl. 1997). The Overby court recognized that a 
"need for retraining when a skill is no longer needed and the 
16 
need for increased education to enhance income [could be] 
important factors that may be considered [in reducing child 
support]." Id. In that case, the Florida judiciary resolved 
that "the focus should be whether the temporary reduction will be 
in the best interests of the [child]." Id. A temporary 
reduction would be permissible if the long term effect would 
benefit the children.7 
Arizona has similarly recognized the importance of a 
temporary modification of a child support that may lead to long 
term economic benefit for the child. Little v. Little, 975 P.2d 
108, 111 (Ariz. 1999). Appellee ignores this aspect of the 
Arizona decision, and rather cites language mandating "the duty 
[to support one's children] persists, with full authority in the 
State to enforce it." Id. at 114. Mr. Diener has never sought 
to abdicate his duty of support. Rather, he has sought to have 
his child support obligation calculated as per the statutory 
guidelines. Thus, his position fully comports with the Tiffany's 
citation to the Little case. 
7
 "In light of today's fast paced changing age of tech-
nology, trial judges will have to evaluate, on a case by case 
basis, whether a temporary reduction in child support payments 
due to a payor's pursuit of an enhanced education will eventually 
be legally beneficial to the recipients." Overby, 698 So.2d at 
815. 
17 
Erich Diener is neither voluntarily unemployed nor 
voluntarily underemployed. The trial court specifically found 
that Mr. Diener requires a college degree "to again obtain 
gainful employment at a reasonable rate of pay." 3/25/2003 
Order, p. 4 (R. 205). In determining the best interests of the 
child, this Court should allow a reduction in child support based 
upon the facts herein, and set child support as per the statutory 
guidelines. 
IV. MR. DIENER DOES NOT HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS. 
Appellee asserts "Mr. Diener admitted he did not tell 
Tiffany he was earning $55,000 a year . . . . " Brief of 
Appellee, p. 18 (citing Transcript, p. 39). That assertion 
distorts the trial testimony and misleads this Court. The actual 
testimony referenced by appellee is as follows: 
Q. [By John Call] Let's talk a little bit about 
your employment with TEKsystems: During the time you were 
erning $55,000 a year, did you offer to pay more child 
support? 
A. [By Erich Diener] No, sir. 
Q. Did you ever go to Tiffany and say, "Gosh, I'm 
making more, I'd like to pay a little more?" 
A. No, sir. 
Transcript, p. 39. Nowhere is there any indication of deceit, 
fraud, or misdeeds on behalf of Mr. Diener in this exchange. 
Nowhere is there any indication that Mr. Diener hid his income 
18 
from Tiffany.8 Indeed, Tiffany was aware at all times of Mr. 
Diener's various employers. Nothing prevented Tiffany from 
seeking a modification of the child support obligation based upon 
Mr. Diener's earnings at TEKsystems. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's request to 
modify the decree to adjust child support. Erich Diener is 
entitled to an adjustment in child support pursuant to Utah law 
after the passage of three (3) years. Furthermore, Erich Diener 
is entitled to a modification based upon the substantial change 
in the parties' circumstances. Finally, the lower court erred in 
finding a bargained-for exchange of alimony for increased child 
support, particularly in light of the fact that no mention of 
said bargain is found in the parties' original divorce papers. 
8
 The parties' Decree of Divorce does not contain a 
provision whereby the parties must exchange income information on 
a yearly basis. Any suggestion that Mr. Diener "hid" his income 
is baseless. 
19 
The lower court should recalculate child support pursuant to 
the guidelines, based upon the parties' current income, and order 
Erich Diener to pay the resulting amount. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of NOVEMBER 2003. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LN ANDS§M l K t OUUNrY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
Daputy Clork 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERICH ROSS DIENER, 
Deferdant. 
ORDER RE: TRIAL DATE 
Case No. 98-490-1948 DA 
(Hon. F. NOEL) 
(Comm. Michael Evans) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the court for 
a telephone scheduling conference on January 7, 2003 at 10:15 
a.m., the plaintiff being represented by John Call, the defendant 
being represented by Brian M. Barnard, based thereon and for good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
This matter is set for a one (1) day bench trial on 
Thursday, February 6, 2003 beginning at 10:00 a.m. on defendant's 
petition for modification; 
The parties shall submit written trial briefs dealing with 
any applicable issues of law on or before Wednesday, February 5, 
2003 at noon; and, 
Although his most recent financial declaration shows his 
actual income at -$245.00 per month, for the sole purpose of 
calculating child support provided a modification is granted in 
the current proceeding, defendant stipulated that income may be 
imputed to him at total of $1,750.00 per month which approximates 
what would have been his income had been working full time at 
Tucci's, where he was most recently employed. 
Dated this^V V day of JANUARY 2003. 
BY THE COURTS 
FRANK NOEL 
Judge 
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